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Abstract 
This paper aims to show that two eminent Italian and Japanese Marxists in the 1930s, Antonio 
Gramsci and Tosaka Jun, shared four important characteristics of so-called Western Marxism. These 
are: 1) a rejection of crude economism; 2) an acknowledgement of the critical role of civil society in 
obtaining people’s consent for the governance of modern states; 3) a scrutiny of the mechanism with 
which people were mobilized through internalization of social norms; and 4) the proposition of an 
alternative reform plan based on the autonomy of politics. Showing that Gramsci and Tosaka shared 
these four characteristics enables us to revisit the framework of Western Marxism, which confusingly 
consists of both theoretical characteristics and geographical criteria. The geographical element comes 
to the forefront in determining what does not count as Western Marxism, drawing boundaries behind 
those theoretical characteristics that were shared beyond these boundaries. As this paper maintains, 
Tosaka’s case may suggest that, during this time, the four theoretical characteristics had 
simultaneously developed in the “periphery,” in the places that were neither central nor remote in 
glowingly globalized values and problems, which clashed, and were often mixed up with, still-resilient 
domestic circumstances. This allows us to examine Italian and Japanese Marxists on the same plane, 
without endorsing the essentialist West–East dichotomy that obscures their shared characteristics. 
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Introduction: Four Elements of Western Marxism 
This article aims to show that two eminent Italian and Japanese Marxists in the 1930s, Antonio 
Gramsci and Tosaka Jun1, provided considerably similar analyses of a series of questions which were 
central in their time: how the superstructure works, how modern states are organized, how people are 
mobilized, and how alternatives to the status quo can be proposed. This similarity enables us to revisit 
the commonly accepted framework of Western Marxism, of which Gramsci is counted one of the 
foremost members. As the paper points out, those features of Western Marxism that give it its 
distinctiveness can also be found in non-Western Marxists of the same era, irrespective of mutual 
contact, as exemplified by the case of Tosaka. 
Coincidentally, both Gramsci and Tosaka ultimately died from prolonged incarceration in 
fascist prisons: Gramsci, the then leader of the Italian Communist Party, died in 1937, shortly after his 
unconditional release; Tosaka, who led the Research Group on Materialism, died just six days before 
the end of World War II. Since his death, Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks have enjoyed worldwide 
popularity, inspiring the social sciences and humanities with, among others, the ideas of hegemony, 
passive revolution, and subaltern groups. Tosaka, by contrast, has remained underexplored in and 
outside of Japan, at least partly because of the triumph of liberalism in the postwar Japanese 
intellectual and political climate. Recently, however, commentators have revisited Tosaka as a radical 
social critic whose analysis and theory was groundbreaking in the Marxist tradition.2 Harry 
Harootunian, a distinguished scholar of Japanese intellectual history, propelled the ongoing reappraisal 
of Tosaka, stating that his Overcome by Modernity – Harootunian’s masterpiece on interwar Japanese 
thought – is in a way “an attempt to retrieve Tosaka’s powerful critique of fascism and [show] how its 
ideological appeal to culture and community was sanctioned by a liberal endowment” (2001: xxx). 
Interestingly, he frequently refers to the similarity between Tosaka and Gramsci, concerning their 
shared focus on the cultural sphere in modern societies (cf. Harootunian 1994: 105; 2002: 240)3. 
Although he has not yet provided a deeper discussion on their affinity, it seems that this has greater 
implications than he may have thought, allowing us to revisit our shared understanding of the 
uniqueness of so-called Western Marxism, as contrasted with orthodox Marxism. 
As Western Marxism as a category is ambiguous by definition, it may include thinkers of 
various inclinations from the first decades of the twentieth century to the present4. In this paper, 
therefore, with the term Western Marxists I limit myself to referring to Marxists who developed their 
thoughts in opposition to orthodox Marxism at the earliest stage up until the 1930s when Gramsci and 
Tosaka also elaborated their thoughts. In this respect, the distinctiveness of Western Marxism can be 
summarized into four points, all of which can be confirmed in the most basic description of Western 
Marxism (Jacoby 1991). 
First, Western Marxism does not espouse the crude economic determinism of orthodox 
Marxism (Jacoby 1991: 524) Generally speaking, while Russian Marxism presumes that economic 
conditions primarily determine the formation of human society, Western Marxism looks at the ways 
that human agency is exercised on the cultural and political terrain – or, to use a Marxist term, the 
“superstructure” – which is relatively independent of the economic base. For example, Rosa 
Luxemburg was the first among these thinkers to stress the autonomy of politics and revolution against 
economic determinism and Leninist vanguardism. Less related to real politics, though, this critique 
was shared by later Marxists, who considered the existing array of economic situations could hardly 
explain the success of the Russian Revolution (e.g. the young Gramsci) and the development of 
consumer society and mass culture (e.g. Adorno, Holkheimer, and Kracauer). 
Next, Western Marxists vigorously scrutinized the distinctive role of ideology as something 
much more than a mere reflection of the economic base (Jacoby 1991: 525). This entails two distinct 
questions that I identify as indicating the second and third characteristics, namely: how it is generated 
and how it affects. Second, then, Western Marxism investigates the way that modern states are 
organized. From the Russian Marxist perspective, states are nothing but organs of violence that serve 
                                                     
1 Japanese names are shown according to the surname-name order.  
2 Tosaka’s selected writings have recently been published in German (2012) and in English (2013), in the latter case together 
with some articles that reassess the significance of Tosaka’s thought.  
3 See also Hirano (2013: 183) and Schäfer (2013: 173–4). 
4 Orthodox Marxists in Soviet Russia were the first to label non-orthodox thinkers in the West such as George Lukács and 
Karl Korsch as “Western Marxists”; yet they then adopted this category to denote their vaguely-shared theoretical 
inclinations (Kellner 2005: 155).  
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the interests of the bourgeoisie, best represented by the police and the army. Western Marxism, 
however, submits that such violence alone cannot preserve the governance of modern states, and 
examines instead how ideology is generated through the apparatuses of modern states to cement the 
existing form of governance. Among other things, this element can be thought to be Gramsci’s best 
contribution to Western Marxism. 
Third, Western Marxism is thus particularly concerned with how people mobilize. If 
modern states cannot operate without mass support, then it is critical to governing to make the 
governed think that they support their government of their own volition; that is, how ideology affects. 
In fact, Western Marxism was eager to develop a theory of consciousness, or how people actually 
think and act, in order to explicate how they internalize social norms. In this regard, Lukács uniquely 
developed the theory of false consciousness; that is, how the consciousness of workers is manipulated 
differently to their position in the world of production. However, in so doing he employed a 
dichotomy between true and false consciousnesses within his overly Hegelian scheme. More grounded 
analysis of how ideology works was provided by Siegfried Kracauer, who pioneered in analyzing how 
the cinema represents social norms. In addition, Erich Fromm and Theodor Adorno offered social 
psychological analysis of how the lower-middle stratum had a certain affinity with fascism.  
Finally, Western Marxists tried to provide alternatives to the status quo, without expecting 
changes in economic conditions to simultaneously alter socio-political circumstances (Jacoby 1991: 
524). With the assumption that the political and cultural realms are relatively independent and 
autonomous, Western Marxists considered that it was their task to propose possible remedies to 
current problems. For example, this varyingly includes Walter Benjamin’s alternative historiography 
and Ernst Bloch’s humanistic utopia achieved by truly revolutionary force. 
The rest of this paper examines how these four general elements are embodied by Gramsci, 
as a prime figure of Western Marxism, and then by Tosaka, as a (geographically) non-Western 
Marxist. Gramsci strongly criticized crude economic determinism while focusing on an analysis of the 
“hegemony” – the consent of the governed to the governing – upon which, he argued, modern states 
work. He then recognized the Catholic Church as the institution that exercised this function in civil 
society, making the governed internalize the social norms of the governing. Observing that Italy’s low 
level of social mobility triggered a stark division between the governing and the governed, and thus 
also a problem of mobilization, Gramsci proposed that educational reform would reduce the gap 
between these social strata, enabling inclusion of mass demands in Italian politics. Likewise, Tosaka 
was reluctant to endorse crude economism on the basis that it cannot account for people’s customs that 
arise within the superstructure, within the relationship between institutions and people’s 
consciousness, and that remain independent of the economic base. Tosaka also conducted a vigorous 
exploration into how mobilization would occur through reinforced education control promoting 
Foucaultian disciplines. In his search for a path different to education, which was occupied by 
nationalist discourse, he then propounded enlightenment through journalism.  
Showing that Tosaka shared the four theoretical characteristics above will enable us to 
revisit the framework of Western Marxism, which – confusingly – involves both theoretical 
characteristics and geographical criteria. The geographical element comes to the forefront in 
determining what does not count as Western Marxism, drawing boundaries behind those theoretical 
characteristics that were, as this paper shows, shared beyond these boundaries5. If we try to do justice 
to the theoretical distinctiveness that is contained in the alleged category of Western Marxism, instead 
of trying to endorse its geographical criteria, Tosaka’s case may suggest that during the early twentieth 
century the four theoretical characteristics outlined above developed simultaneously in the 
“periphery”. Rather than implying inferiority, “periphery” here denotes those loci that were neither 
central nor remote in the strikingly globalized values and problems which clashed and were often 
mixed up with still-resilient domestic circumstances. The notion of “periphery” thus allows us to 
examine Italian and Japanese Marxists on the same plane, without endorsing the essentialist West–
East dichotomy that obscures their shared characteristics. 
 
Gramsci (1): Critique of Economic Determinism 
In this section, I examine how Gramsci embodies the critique of crude economic determinism widely 
shared by Western Marxists. In his Marxist framework, Gramsci not only distinguished the economic 
base from the superstructure, but he also saw civil and political society as belonging to the 
superstructure (cf. L: 481/ LP2: 67). Rather than focusing on political society (i.e. “the state” in a 
narrow sense) as violence, he focused on the role of civil society in producing consent among the 
people. He thought that for modern states to exercise governance, it was essential that they acquire the 
                                                     
5 This geographical characterization is, of course, seen in most of the literature. See, as classic and recent examples, 
Anderson (1976: 24-26) and Linden (2007: 5). 
Western Marxism or Marxism in the “Periphery”? 
 
3 
consent of the people, or hegemony. One of the biggest debates in the literature on this framework 
concerns whether Gramsci was a Western Marxist who explored the unique functions of civil society 
as the domain of human autonomy regardless of the economic base, or whether he was an orthodox 
Marxist, explicating human affairs as simple reflections of their economic circumstances. One notable 
instance of the debate on this issue was that between Norberto Bobbio and Jacques Texier. For 
Bobbio, Gramsci’s notion of civil society included ideological and cultural relations as well as moral 
and intellectual elements. This stands in opposition to Marx’s notion of civil society, which is the 
ensemble of material relations. Bobbio thus underscores how, for Gramsci, civil society has 
supremacy over the economic base (Bobbio 1979: 33). By contrast, Texier argues that in Gramsci the 
superstructure of any particular historical period depends on the degree of economic development. As 
such, Gramsci’s civil society represents “the complex of practical and ideological social relations [...] 
which is established and grows up on the base of determined relations of production” (1979: 71). 
Texier thus stresses how for Gramsci the social relations of production exist between the 
superstructure and the base, and that these relations are the factors determining the possible functions 
of civil society as the domain of hegemony. 
The stark contrast between these two lines of argument was mediated by Joseph Femia. He 
contends that Gramsci’s view of the relation between the base and the superstructure is that “the base 
constrains what forms of consciousness are possible [TC: in the superstructure]” (Femia 1981: 121). 
Femia bases this claim on Gramsci being mostly concerned with the kinds of superstructural formation 
that are possible within the given constraints of the economy, and this does not signify that a particular 
form of superstructure is automatically determined (cf. Q4§15: 437/ PN2: 157). However, Femia’s 
view does not fully account for Gramsci’s awareness of those elements of the superstructure that are 
survivors of the collapse of the economic base that gave birth to them. In other words, Gramsci was 
conscious of the non-synchronicity of the superstructure and the economic base, from which the 
autonomy of civil society emerges: 
 
I do not think that many people would argue that, once a structure has been changed, all the 
elements of the corresponding superstructure must of necessity collapse. What happens, instead, is 
that out of an ideology which arose to guide the popular masses – and which therefore cannot but 
take account of certain of their interests – several elements must survive: natural law itself, which 
may have declined for the educated classes, is preserved by the Catholic religion and is more alive 
in the people than one thinks (Q10II§41xii: 1322/ FS: 398). 
 
As thus stated, Gramsci recognized the autonomy of religion working in civil society as a residue of a 
former structure. This means that even if the economic structure is changed it does not necessarily 
follow that the corresponding superstructure is therefore simultaneously obliterated (cf. Morera 1990: 
74–85). For Gramsci, then, after the collapse of a structure it becomes a task of human agency to 
critically examine the remaining superstructural elements. As we shall see, the prime example of this 
is the still resilient influence of Catholicism on Italian society. 
Texier’s claim that Gramsci too holds that the economic base is the ultimate factor in 
society may not be wrong, but the emphasis should be put on Gramsci’s insistence that the economic 
base cannot sweep away everything in the superstructure – and particularly in civil society – all at 
once. Again, it is the role of politics as the exercise of human agency that examines and addresses 
those problems in civil society that continue to live on, independently of the economic base from 
which they are born. It is precisely in this sense that Gramsci is categorized as one of the Western 
Marxists who rejected the crude economism that the Russian Marxists assumed. 
 
Gramsci (2): Hegemony as the Consent of the Governed 
At the centre of his analysis of the problems remaining in the superstructure, Gramsci propounded that 
the governance of modern states increasingly rested on the “spontaneous” consent of the governed 
(Q12§1: 1519/ SPN: 12; Q26§6: 2302/ SPN: 261). This analysis, employing his concept of 
“hegemony,” leads him to the second characteristic of Western Marxism, about the formation of 
modern states. 
Gramsci expressed his contempt for contemporary dominant understandings of the state 
that saw it solely as violence, and thus as a night-watchman state (Q26§6: 2302/ SPN: 261). When 
voicing this contempt, he surely had in mind orthodox Marxists who regarded the state simply as an 
organ that protects bourgeois interests. As noted above, by dividing political society as the terrain of 
violence and civil society as that of consent, Gramsci focused on the role of the latter as the very 
means to maintain modern states (Q6§88: 763–4/ SPN: 263). In modern mass society, he considered it 
critical that states obtained mass consent if they were to successfully exercise governance. In order to 
analyze how (or the extent to which) they succeed in obtaining the consent of the people, he adopted 
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the concept of “hegemony” to denote the situation where consent is properly given to the governing 
body, allowing the stable exercise of governance (Q8§191: 1056/ PN3: 345). In other words, when 
hegemony persists, the relationship between the ruling elites and the masses is stable. If it unstable, 
however, there arises a “crisis of hegemony”, or an “organic crisis” (cf. Q13§23: 1602/ SPN: 210): 
 
[…] this crisis manifests itself in the ever growing difficulty to form governments and in the ever 
greater instability of the governments themselves, and has its immediate origin in the 
multiplication of parliamentary parties and in the [permanent] internal crises of each of these 
parties (that is, there occurs within each party the same thing that occurs in parliament: difficulties 
of government [and instability of leadership]). (Q1§48: 59/ PN1: 156).6 
 
Clearly, here the crisis stemmed from the uneven relationship between the ruling class and the masses, 
as they lost the stable and hegemonic relationship vital to the governance of modern states: “[i]f the 
ruling class has lost consent, that is, if it no longer ‘leads’ but only ‘rules’ – it possesses sheer coercive 
power – this actually means that the great masses have become detached from traditional ideologies 
[...]. The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born.” (Q3§34: 
311/ PN2: 33, amended TC) 
It is noteworthy that Gramsci discerned such a crisis in the contemporary Italian situation.7 
By explaining that “[d]uring the postwar period, the hegemonic apparatus cracks and the exercise of 
hegemony becomes ever more difficult,” he described the Italian postwar situation as one in “crisis” 
(Q1§48: 59/ PN1: 156). I cannot do justice to the Italian postwar situation here, but it suffices to say 
that it revealed the failure of the Italian state to include the demands of the masses since the 
Risorgimento, giving fascism the opportunity to obtain large mass support against the liberal 
government.8 In this situation, argued Gramsci, it was a critical task for the Italian state to include the 
unheard voices of the masses, and to thereby improve its low social mobility. Gramsci explained this 
as “democracy”, closely related to “hegemony:”  
 
Among many meanings of democracy, the most realistic and concrete one, in my view, is that 
which can be brought into relief through the connection between democracy and the concept of 
hegemony. In the hegemonic system, there is democracy between the leading group and the groups 
that are led to the extent that (the development of the economy and thus) the legislation (which is 
an expression of that development) favours the (molecular) transition from the groups that are led 
[gruppi diretti] to the leading group [gruppo dirigente] (Q8§191: 1056/ PN3: 345, amended TC). 
 
Finocchiaro (1999: 115–6) regards this passage as of utmost importance in terms of Gramsci’s notion 
of democracy, and argues that it indicates that “democracy”, for Gramsci, lay in the social mobility 
taking place between the leading group and the groups that are led. Therefore, as we will see, 
Gramsci’s task was to recover the stable and hegemonic relationship between these groups, and thus 
improve the rate of social mobility.  
At this juncture, Gramsci observed that modern states depend on the consent of the people, 
rather than on violence, and this enabled him to analyse how Italian politics was destabilized due to 
the lack of such consent. This observation differentiated him from the orthodox Marxist account of the 
state as solely a bourgeois means of violence, and he thus appropriated the second characteristic of 
Western Marxism. It is crucial, here, to note that the Catholic Church helped preserve the actual 
separation between the political elite and the masses, as well as the mechanism preventing the Italian 
masses from expressing their demands. Ideological processes – mostly exercised by the Church – 
made people internalize given social norms as their own.  
 
Gramsci (3): Common Sense and the Catholic Church  
In this section, I examine Gramsci’s investigation of the Catholic Church in connection with the issue 
of the mobilization of people in modern states – a topic explored by Western Marxists. According to 
Gramsci, since the French Revolution, where various ideological currents both religious and secular 
emerged, the Catholic Church had adopted a modern ideological strategy by transforming itself into a 
“party” contesting the validity of its accounts of the world against other currents (Q20§1: 2081/ FS: 
                                                     
6 The words in square brackets here are from the revised passage in Notebook 13 (Q13§37: 1639/ FS: 92). The quoted 
passage remains the same except for these added words. 
7 Only a small amount of literature has focused on how Gramsci’s analysis of the crisis of hegemony echoed the breakdown 
of the hegemony of Italian liberalism. See Bracco (1980) and Farneti (1994).  
8 For a detailed discussion, see Chino (2013: Ch. 4).  
Western Marxism or Marxism in the “Periphery”? 
 
5 
29; Q20§2: 2086/ FS: 34). Gramsci observed that this transformation culminated with the Lateran 
Pacts, ratified in 1929, which enabled the Church to give its teachings access to the “common sense” 
of the Italian people through non-religious means such as education. 
Gramsci defined common sense as the ordinary yet often contradictory view of the world 
held among the people, in contrast to philosophy, which was a well-grounded and coherent conception 
(Q11§12: 1375–6/ SPN: 323–4). The inconsistencies of common sense often appear as a separation 
between thought and action. However, Gramsci did not attribute such inconsistency to intellectual 
dishonesty. According to him, it occurred due to a conception of the world imposed by intellectuals 
belonging to other social groups. In cases where contrast between thought and action is observed, 
Gramsci remarked that: 
 
[it] cannot but be the expression of profounder contrasts of a social historical order. It signifies that 
the social group in question may indeed have its own conception of the world, even if only 
embryonic; a conception which manifests itself in action, but occasionally and in flashes – when, 
that is, the group is acting as an organic totality. But this same group has, for reasons of 
submission and intellectual subordination, adopted a conception which is not its own but is 
borrowed from another group; and it affirms this conception verbally and believes itself to be 
following it, because this is the conception which it follows in ‘normal times’ – that is when its 
conduct is not independent and autonomous, but submissive and subordinate (Q11§12: 1379/ SPN: 
326–7). 
 
Gramsci described this contradiction between thought and action in terms of an individual having two 
theoretical consciousnesses, or one “contradictory consciousness” (cf. Femia 1981: 35–50; 218–35). 
One of them, according to Gramsci, is “implicit in his activity and which in reality unites him with all 
his fellow-collaborators in the practical transformation of the real world,” whereas the other one is 
“superficially explicit or verbal, which he has inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed.” This 
contradictory state of consciousness in turn produces “a condition of moral and political passivity,” 
allowing little possibility of autonomous decision of action (Q11§12: 1385/ SPN: 333 amended TC)9. 
If people’s consciousness appears contradictory and thus passive, they can hardly express their 
concerns. They come to merely repeat what they have taken for granted as common sense. 
Crucially, Gramsci regarded religion as a main supplier of common sense (Q11§12: 1375/ 
SPN: 323). This was a major reason for his vigorous investigation of the role of the Catholic Church in 
Italian society: he explained how Catholicism permeated the common sense of the Italian people. The 
prime example of this seems to be his insistence on people’s belief in the objectively real world:  
 
The public “believes” that the external world is objectively real, but it is precisely here that the 
question arises: what is the origin of this “belief” and what critical value does it “objectively” 
have? In fact the belief is of religious origin, even if the man who shares it is indifferent to 
religion. Since all religions have taught and do teach that the world, nature, the universe were 
created by God before the creation of man, and therefore man found the world already made, 
catalogued and defined once and for all, this belief has become an iron fact of “common sense” 
and survives with the same solidity even if religious feeling is dead or asleep (Q11§17: 1412/SPN: 
441). 
 
As such, once settled in people’s minds, common sense appears as the truth, unlike the presupposed 
fallibility, and thus renewability, of scientific knowledge (Q11§37: 1455-6/FS: 291–2). 
It was in this sense that Gramsci paid particular attention to the Lateran Pacts. According to 
him, the most important part of the Pacts was the Concordat between the Italian state and the Church 
that acknowledged Catholicism as the official religion, giving official recognition to the religious 
organization Catholic Action and making religious education mandatory in secondary level education 
(it was already mandatory at elementary level). He considered the underlying context of the Concordat 
to not just be the fascist government’s attempt to show its political competence by resolving the 
situation stemming from the Italian state’s annexation of Rome during the Risorgimento, but also the 
Church’s intention to permeate people’s common sense (Q5§71: 606/ FS: 59–60; cf. Colarizi 2000: 
190–1). The then Pope, Pius XI, described by Gramsci as the “Jesuit Pope” (Q20§4: 2092/FS: 81), 
                                                     
9 His example of this contradictory consciousness is the young clergymen who held modernist (progressive) opinions and 
who yet verbally swore an anti-modernist oath (Q20§4: 2090/ FS: 78). 
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aimed at preventing mass apostasy and at reviving the supremacy of the Church. While the fascist 
government interpreted the Church’s aim in ratifying the Pact as achieving only spiritual supremacy, 
considered Gramsci, in Pius XI’s understanding the Church as the perfect society straddled both the 
spiritual and earthly domains (Q5§71: 606/ FS: 59–60). With this argument, Gramsci implied that the 
fascist government failed to understand that, for the Church, achieving its spiritual supremacy 
necessarily meant achieving its earthly supremacy at the same time. However, much as this may be a 
“medieval conception,” the fascist state and the Church’s different understandings of the place of the 
Church in society underpinned their different understandings of the Concordat (Q6§24: 703–4/FS: 75–
6). Drawing on the fascist state’s misunderstanding of the Church’s aim, the Church exploited 
Catholic Action and religious education to make the Italian public internalize ideas of a religious 
origin as their common sense. 
Catholic Action and religious education were the chief means by which the Church spread 
Catholic teachings outside its own institutions. After the banning of political parties, Catholic Action 
enjoyed a privileged status in Italian civil society. Gramsci sought the roots of the Church’s strategy in 
the idea of the “formula of the indirect power of the Church over all civil sovereignties” advocated by 
the sixteenth century Jesuit cardinal Roberto Bellarmino, who was canonized by Pius XI (Q6§151: 
809/FS: 21; Q16§11ii: 1871/FS: 67). In fact, in Gramsci’s time the Church was managed mostly by 
those of the Jesuit orientation. Religious education played a part in this strategy. By penetrating Italy’s 
public education system from elementary education to higher education10, the Church acquired a 
number of opportunities to maintain the position of the clergy and to disseminate its teachings among 
the Italian public. As a result, the Concordat weakened the totalitarian character of the fascist state. All 
in all, by underestimating the Church’s “secular” intervention as the source of its popularly grounded 
strength, the fascist state failed to understand the mechanism through which the Church’s alleged 
spiritual superiority in fact rested on the earthly. 
Gramsci explicated the Church’s strength in civil society in terms of the relation between 
two fundamental social strata: the intellectuals and the masses. As stated in the following paragraph, 
which is worth quoting at length, the strength of the Church rested on its resilience in maintaining a 
hierarchical relationship, while at the same time avoiding a definitive break between these two strata: 
 
The strength of religions, and of the Catholic church in particular, has lain, and still lies, in the fact 
that they feel very strongly the need for the doctrinal unity of the whole mass of the faithful and 
strive to ensure that the higher intellectual stratum does not get separated from the lower. The 
Roman church has always been the most vigorous in the struggle to prevent the “official” 
formation of two religions, one for the “intellectuals” and the other for the “simple souls.” The 
struggle has not been without serious disadvantages for the Church itself, but these disadvantages 
are connected with the historical process which is transforming the whole of civil society and 
which contains overall a corrosive critique of all religion, and they only serve to emphasize the 
organizational capacity of the clergy in the cultural sphere and the abstractly rational and just 
relationship which the Church has been able to establish in its own sphere between the 
intellectuals and the simple. The Jesuits have undoubtedly been the major architects of this 
equilibrium, and in order to preserve it they have given the Church a progressive forward 
movement which has tended to allow the demands of science and philosophy to be to a certain 
extent satisfied. But the rhythm of the movement has been so slow and methodical that the 
changes have been unobserved by the mass of the simple […] (Q11§12: 1380–1/ SPN: 328–9). 
 
The Church as a group of traditional intellectuals provided the people with their view of the world as 
universal, while keeping people separate from access to contemporary views.  
As a result, the Church maintained the hierarchical order between intellectuals (i.e. the 
clergy) and the masses (i.e. lay believers), thereby preserving the current array of social strata in 
Italian society. According to Gramsci, Croce the greatest intellectual of the time neither noticed nor 
addressed this separation as a problem reinforced by the Catholic Church (Q10II§41iv: 1305/ FS: 
473). In his critical reply to Croce, Gramsci looked into the structure of common sense, without 
endorsing the Marxist separation between true and false consciousness. George Lukács famously 
developed the theory of false consciousness, assuming that people’s consciousness should emerge in 
accordance with the position of their class in the world of production (Lukács 1971). Hence, the 
proletariat, as the most repressed class, should obtain a true revolutionary consciousness after rejecting 
the false consciousness that had been imposed by the bourgeoisie. Clearly, Gramsci’s view of 
consciousness did not assume such synchronicity with the class position. Rather, he assumed the very 
                                                     
10 Gramsci also paid attention to the foundation of the first Catholic university in Italy as early as 1921 which enabled the 
Church to recruit their intellectuals (Q16§11ii: 1868/FS: 64). 
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reality of every type of consciousness that people have. This empirical viewpoint sharply 
differentiated him from those – not just orthodox Marxists, but also Lukács as one of the earliest 
Western Marxists – who take class position as the determinant of consciousness. 
A final problem still remains. If Gramsci’s analysis revealed the mechanism through which 
people are mobilized in modern states as consisting in internalization of social norms, then how did he 
propose to address this problem? As the next section reveals, unlike orthodox Marxism, which 
anticipated a change in the economic structure would simultaneously alter the superstructure, Gramsci 
proposed that educational reform would eliminate the gap of cultural capital between the elite and the 
masses which had been at the base of the Italian state since the Risorgimento. 
 
Gramsci (4): Educational Reform to Improve Social Mobility 
The underlying principle in Gramsci’s proposal for educational reform is the relative autonomy of 
human affairs, as independent from the economic base. The reform proposal thus shows that Gramsci 
inherently possessed the fourth characteristic of Western Marxism: of seeking alternatives to the status 
quo without expecting the changes to emerge from the establishment of a new economic structure.  
Examining how the Catholic Church informed the common sense of Italian society, 
Gramsci saw the gap between intellectuals and the masses as the key to Italian society, and began 
thinking of how to remedy the de facto separation between the high culture of the intellectuals and the 
common sense of the people. He considered it possible to distil from unsorted common sense a “good 
sense” with a more appropriate grasp of the world (Q11§12: 1378/ SPN: 325–6). In this way, he 
rejected the epistemological separation between philosophy and common sense. It was from this 
position that he likewise rejected the sociological separation between intellectuals and the masses. In 
modern society, the difference between these fundamental social groups is significantly reproduced 
through educational processes. However, in the first decade of the twentieth century, social mobility in 
Italy was lower than that of Germany and France (cf. Malatesta 2005: 18–20). This suggests that 
formal education in Italy at that time rarely remedied the gap between the elite and the masses. It was 
for this reason that Gramsci called for educational reform to address the tremendous gap of cultural 
capital that had separated the two since the Renaissance11. He turned his attention to how this gap 
affected children’s achievement at the micro level, in the classroom situation:  
 
Undoubtedly the child of a traditionally intellectual family acquires this psycho-physical daption 
more easily. Before he ever enters the classroom he has numerous advantages over his comrades, 
and is already in possession of attitudes learnt from his family environment: he concentrates more 
easily, since he is used to “sitting still,” etc. [...] This is why many people think that the difficulty 
of study conceals some “trick” which handicaps them – that is, when they do not simply believe 
that they are stupid by nature (Q12§2: 1549–50/ SPN: 42–3). 
 
What Gramsci here called “advantage”, or “trick”, would in our vocabulary belong to the concept of 
“cultural capital.” Neither the educational reform resulting from the Lateran Pacts nor the Gentile 
Reform attempted to close this gap or assumed the possibility of increasing social mobility through 
education. Quite the contrary, they served to reinforce the given social formation. Gramsci’s proposed 
educational reform aimed at addressing this problem by, for example, educating students up to the age 
of sixteen in boarding schools – what he called “unitary schools” – and by eliminating the separation 
between classical and vocational schools (Q12§1: 1534–5/ SPN: 29–31; Q12§2: 1547/ SPN: 40). His 
aim was to detach students from their family backgrounds and to inculcate a certain habit of 
concentration in their formative study. The underlying idea of this reform is well expressed in the 
following passage: 
 
Would a scholar at the age of forty be able to sit for sixteen hours on end at his work table if he 
had not, as a child, compulsorily, through mechanical coercion, acquired the appropriate psycho-
physical habits? If one wishes to produce great scholars, one still has to start at this point and 
apply pressure throughout the educational system in order to succeed in creating those thousands 
or hundreds or even only dozens of scholars of the highest quality (Q12§2: 1544/ SPN: 37). 
 
Certainly, Gramsci intended to recruit new intellectuals from the masses, and thereby to increase 
social mobility. Gramsci’s proposal thus marks a stark contrast with the Catholic Church’s policy of 
influencing people’s common sense and of maintaining the established restrictions on membership of 
the intellectual stratum. By contrast, thanks to his empirically grounded perspective, Gramsci 
                                                     
11 For a detailed discussion, see Chino (2013: 194–-9). 
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considered it necessary and possible to remedy this gap between these social groups with his 
educational reform. This demonstrates his possession of the fourth characteristic of Western Marxism: 
providing an alternative to the status quo without anticipating that the changes would stem from those 
in the economic structure. 
So far, I have argued that Gramsci possessed the four characteristics distinctive of Western 
Marxism, namely: 1) rejection of crude economism and acknowledgement of the relative autonomy of 
the superstructure; 2) recognition of the critical role of civil society in obtaining the consent of the 
people which makes modern states maintain their governance; 3) scrutiny of the mechanism by which 
mobilization of people takes place; and 4) the proposal of an alternative reform plan based on the 
autonomy of politics. All in all, for Gramsci, rather than providing a prediction of the collapse of 
capitalism, Marxism’s very task was to analyze modern states – the characteristics of which were most 
keenly observed in the resplendent Italian fascist state – and also to provide an alternative picture of 
the modern state. In what follows, I will explore how, in his vigorous investigation of the problems of 
the Japanese state at the time, Tosaka Jun also displayed the characteristics listed above, and displayed 
a considerable similarity to his Italian counterpart.  
 
Tosaka (1): Research Group on “Materialism”?  
Like Gramsci, Tosaka Jun has been described as a unique Marxist within his local context. One of 
Tosaka’s unique features stems from the contradiction between the name of the group that he led – the 
Research Group on Materialism – and the writings produced throughout his relatively short career as a 
writer, between 1928 and 1937. He wrote extensively on the theory of ideology, space and time, 
scientific methods, and current affairs. I cannot do justice to all of his unique elaborations on 
Marxism, yet this list suggests that he wrote little about materialism in an orthodox Marxist sense. As 
far as I know, the only book of his that discussed Marxism as an economic theory is the instructive 
book Lecture on Modern Materialism. This contradiction raises a question regarding the nature of his 
theoretical investigations concerning issues in the realm that Gramsci would have referred to as “civil 
society.” In order to interpret this aspect of Tosaka, we need to briefly look at the context of pre-war 
Marxism in Japan12. At the end of this section we will see that Tosaka, like Gramsci, possessed the 
first characteristic of Western Marxism; namely a rejection of crude economism.  
After being disbanded in 1924, the Japanese Communist Party (hereafter JCP) was re-
established in 1926, but it had two opposing factions: the vanguardism of Fukumoto, and the populism 
of Yamakawa. These factions were based on differences in their recognition of the current Japanese 
situation in relation to the Meiji Restoration in 1868. Fukumoto, having studied under Georg Lukács 
and Karl Korsch, advocated the two-stage theory of revolution, according to which a proletarian 
revolution would have to be preceded by a bourgeois revolution – one that Fukumoto was still waiting 
for. Yamakawa, by contrast, considered the Meiji Restoration to have been a bourgeois revolution and 
that the next revolution was the proletarian. However, the Comintern’s rejection of both factions in 
1927 cost Fukumoto his previously enormous influence, and Yamakawa – who did not join the re-
established JCP from the outset – organized the Rōnō-ha (the Workers and Peasants Faction) outside 
the Party. In 1930, some JCP theorists, later labelled Kōza-ha (the Lecture Faction), edited a series of 
books entitled Lectures on the History of the Development of Japanese Capitalism. Partly inheriting 
Fukumoto’s view, they insisted that the coming revolution would be bourgeois, and that it would bring 
the abolishment of the monarchy and the large landowning system. As the police severely suppressed 
Marxism in general, the debate did not last long. However, these factions nevertheless certainly 
informed the two main strands of pre-war Japanese Marxism, and had echoes in the postwar period.  
Apart from these main strands, there were thinkers – often categorized as the Left of the 
controversial Kyoto School – who aimed to shape Marxism as a new science, beyond Neo-Kantian 
dichotomy and Heideggerian transcendentalism. Miki Kiyoshi, who studied under Heinrich Rickert 
and subsequently Martin Heidegger, appeared as the first figure in this trend. He is said to have 
become a Marxist after returning to Japan, having observed that the vanguardist Marxism of 
Fukumoto did not reflect the political and economic situation in Japan, due to a lack of empirical and 
scientific investigation. Together with Hani Gorō, famous as a translator of Croce’s historiographical 
works, Miki founded the journal Under the Flag of New Science in 1928, which aimed to develop 
Marxism as a non-dogmatic science. With the suppression of leftist movements, however, Miki was 
arrested in 1930 on the allegation of financing the illegal JCP, which brought an end to his 
engagement in public activities. In 1933, the Alliance of Proletarian Science, established in 1929, was 
also banned. 
                                                     
12 The general account of pre-war Japanese Marxism in the following two paragraphs draws on Tairako (2006) and Takeuchi 
(1966). 
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It was in this context that Tosaka Jun organized the Research Group on Materialism in 
1932, regularly publishing its own journal, Materialism Studies13. Having studied natural sciences at 
Kyoto University, Tosaka shared Miki’s interest in developing Marxism as a science – although 
Tosaka himself was highly critical of Miki. Some members of the group were remnants of the Kōza-
ha, Hani Gorō among them. However, Tosaka strangely remained silent regarding the debate on 
Japanese capitalism, at least in his published works14. As Harootunian (2001: 137) notes, Toska’s 
critical elaboration of Marxism was at odds with the developmental economism shared by both 
factions, although it is difficult to give a precise answer to what exactly his silence means. It is certain 
that he submitted that the mode of production is the final determinant of human thoughts and 
activities. However, at the heart of his theory, he criticized crude economism for being unable to grasp 
the customs of people in everyday life. In doing so, Tosaka particularly looked at the failure of crude 
economism to acknowledge the reciprocal relations between institutions and people’s consciousness 
that exist solely within the superstructure, and how people comfortably internalize the norms upheld 
by these institutions. The failure results from the ordinary Marxist framework only being able to 
explain aspects of the superstructure in terms of the economic structure (Tosaka 2001: 16). One of 
Tosaka’s purposes was therefore to illustrate what was missing in the ordinary Marxist account based 
on crude economism; namely, to show how people internalize social norms through institutions. All in 
all, like Gramsci, Tosaka valued the role of the economy as the ultimate determinant of society. 
However, also like Gramsci, he rejected the crude economism that neglected the superstructural 
elements that were notably important for modern states in his time. I shall look at these issues in turn.  
 
Tosaka (2): Modernity and People’s “Custom” 
Tosaka’s unique analysis of custom rest on two criticisms: one aims at orthodox Marxists neglecting 
the distinctiveness of people’s custom as it emerges within the superstructure; the other aims at 
Japanese anthropologists and cultural theorists identifying such customs as the culture of the nation 
that had existed since the beginning of history. Developing his extensive critique of “Japanism” in his 
Japanese Ideology, Tosaka problematized the blindingly obvious essentialist notion of culture. 
Harootunian (2001: xxix-xxxi) points out that such Japanism – a prototype of fascism – emerged in 
reaction to the rapid spread of modern capitalism. Despite its declarations of universality, capitalism 
necessarily depends on differences in time and place in order to keep producing surplus value, and it is 
thus connected to unequal development. Fascism mobilizes people’s unsatisfied desire to flatten out 
the necessary contradictions of capitalism by emphasizing myths and symbols that represent the 
eternity of the given nation. Tosaka thus diagnosed the “nationalization” of custom in his time as a 
symptom of fascism, and tried to elaborate how a certain custom actually emerges at a particular time. 
Like Gramsci, doing this brought him to notice that modern states largely rely on the governed being 
in spontaneous agreement with the governing. In this sense, Tosaka shows the second characteristic of 
Western Marxism, which looks at the mechanism of functioning of modern states.  
In his Thought and Custom, published in 1936, Tosaka examined “custom”, or Fūzoku, 
both as a set of political and legal institutions and as people’s consciousness that they feel comfortable 
in internalizing the norms upheld by these institutions (i.e. Seido Shūtoku Kan) (Tosaka 2001: 15–
21)15. As noted above, Tosaka asserted that the ordinary Marxist framework, looking only at how the 
economy determines the superstructure, cannot explain the nature of custom since custom emerges in 
relations within the superstructure. According to Tosaka, people feel comfortable in adopting the given 
social norms simply because conformism is triggered by the fact that the masses share a way of 
thinking and acting. He contended that taking part in this process of conformism would give people 
the feeling that they are doing a morally right thing – it is this sense of morality that makes them 
comfortable (Tosaka 2001: 20–1). Crucially, Tosaka’s theoretical contribution lies in his finding that 
people adopt the dominant social norms not because of false consciousness, but because doing so 
provides them with conformity as a justification for their actions, or as a morality that they feel 
comfortable with. 
In her commentary on Thought and Custom, Lin Shukumi remarks that Tosaka’s custom 
overlaps with the idea of overdetermination as proposed by one of the eminent Western Marxists, 
                                                     
13 See also Lin (2005) for the general context in which Tosaka’s works are situated.  
14 However, it is assumed that Tosaka wrote some twenty-two articles under a pseudonym, not contained in his collected 
works (Kitabayashi 2011).  
15 This is a term coined by Tosaka: Seido means “institutions”; Shūtoku “acquired” or “learned”; and Kan “consciousness” or 
“feeling”.  
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Louis Althusser (Lin 2001: 410). Althusser defined overdetermination as superstructural elements 
reproducing themselves in their own right:  
 
[…] a revolution in the structure does not ipso facto modify the existing superstructures and 
particularly the ideologies at one blow (as it would if the economic was the sole determinant 
factor), for they have sufficient of their own consistency to survive beyond their immediate life 
context, even to recreate, to “secrete” substitute conditions of existence temporarily (Althusser 
2005: 115–16).  
 
Lin is right in pointing out that Tosaka shared Althusser’s view that the superstructure–base 
relationship cannot explain the autonomous reproduction (in Althusser’s term, “reactivation”) of 
superstructural elements. To understand this process of reproduction, or “the theory of the particular 
essence of the specific elements of the superstructure” (Althusser 2005: 114), Althusser later 
developed his theory of the “ideological apparatus of the state.” He thereby specified institutions such 
as schools, the courts, the police, and so forth, as the apparatuses that maintain and reproduce the 
given social norms (Althusser 2008: 16–7). It is well known that Althusser considered Gramsci to be 
the only one who had preceded him in this endeavour (Althusser 2008: 16n7; 18).  
In this respect, Tosaka and Gramsci, like Althusser, retained their interest in interpreting 
this mechanism of modern states, noted as the second characteristic of Western Marxism. Like 
Gramsci’s notion of consent, for Tosaka, custom represents the link between institutions and people’s 
consciousness at any particular time, and he thus avoids portraying Japanese culture in an essentialist, 
and therefore timeless, manner. He was able to find many concrete examples of the current formation 
of custom in contemporary Japanese society. For instance, he discovered that the ideological control 
reinforced by the Japanese state in the 1930s informed the public custom, enabling the state to 
mobilize it.  
 
Tosaka (3): Ideological Control via Schooling 
Like Gramsci, who discovered the Church’s mechanism for mobilizing the Italian public, Tosaka 
scrutinized ideological control as the very means by which the Japanese state made people internalize 
norms, and thereby mobilized them. It is exactly in this respect that Tosaka possessed the third 
characteristic of Western Marxism, which probes into the modes of mobilization in modern states.  
In the 1930s, many critical events revealed the contradictions in the Japanese state: the gap 
between countryside and city, and the loosened control over the military were examples of this. Strong 
nationalism, associated with ideological control, seemed to disguise the anxious atmosphere. It was in 
this context in 1933 that the Takigawa incident took place, with the Ministry of Education suspending 
Yukitoki Takigawa from teaching at Kyoto University due to his alleged Marxist inclination. Such 
suppression culminated in the so-called Emperor Organ Theory Incident in 1935. Ultranationalists and 
young military officers harshly attached Tatsukichi Minobe’s theory that identified the Emperor as an 
organ of constitutional monarchy, arguing that the Emperor was independent of, and superior to, the 
constitution. This incident was followed in 1935 by an attempted coup d’état, known as the February 
26 Incident, in which young officers aimed to achieve direct governance for the Emperor. 
Reflecting the atmosphere of his time, and clearly inspired by Marx’s German Ideology16, 
Tosaka’s Japanese Ideology, first published in 1935 and then in an expanded edition in 1936, aimed to 
develop a theory of ideology. He claimed that by its nature ideological control must work with the 
cultural sphere (JI: 186–7). This included the Foucaultian disciplining of students’ bodies through 
gymnastics, line-ups, choruses, or bowing to the Emperor’s picture. School principals had to read the 
Rescript on Education at school ceremonies so as to implant in students a patriarchal hierarchy and 
thus the sense of the Japanese nation as a quasi-family with the Emperor at its top. Tosaka thus 
identified schooling as the very means of internalization of social norms (JI: 187–90):  
 
As is known, education control is quite strict in Japan, and among others elementary schools (and 
junior-high schools as well) have become exemplary exercise areas of such control. Authority over 
education neither stems from the Analects [of Confucius], Buddhist scriptures, nor Socratic ideals; 
nor can it stem from Rousseau or Pestalozzi. Instead of seeing these universal and humane cultural 
authorities, we have to observe the oppressions of the violently constructed idée with 
unilateralistic legal authority (JI: 187).  
                                                     
16 The Research Group on Materialism translated the Adoratsky version of German Ideology, originally published in 1932, 
into Japanese as early as 1936. Like Thought and Custom, Japanese Ideology includes many stimulating pieces 
conveying the thrust of Tosaka’s thought. Yet only three articles from this book are currently available in English and in 
German (and none from Thought and Custom). 
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Noting that this is “the typical case of control in general in Japan,” he added that education at large – 
including various types of schools, youth and veteran organizations, and religious groups – involves 
this control either directly or indirectly (JI: 187). For Tosaka, schooling was the prime example of 
those institutions that preserve and reproduce the status quo by permeating people’s consciousness. 
Later, in 1937 when the Second Sino-Japanese War was triggered, the Japanese State, then under the 
Konoe Administration, started mobilizing the people. Observing the success of the state in controlling 
people’s custom mostly through education, Tosaka argued that: 
 
[t]hought is […] a conception that has a certain organized inclination. Mobilization of thought as 
such, once exercised, cannot be dismissed so easily. Even if mobilization is dismissed, the thought 
that has developed through mobilization can hardly be dismissed. Moreover, to a certain extent, 
this thought would achieve a glowingly systematic development in the direction that it was 
mobilized (Tosaka 2006: 186).  
 
Critically, once internalized, it is no longer necessary to employ external institutions to maintain the 
norms, simply because they now act in people’s minds by themselves. 
Similar to Gramsci’s analysis of the Church’s influence on the Italian public, Tosaka 
noticed how resiliently internalized the social norms were in people’s minds. By examining the 
example of schooling in contemporary Japan, he illustrated the process of ideological control as the 
mobilization of thought necessary prior to that of action. It is in this sense that Tosaka shared the third 
characteristic of Western Marxism, which explores how the mobilization of people takes place. 
 
Tosaka (4): Enlightenment through Journalism 
In this final section, I explore Tosaka’s alternative to ideological control. He shared with Gramsci the 
idea that alternatives should stem from human autonomy irrespective of the economic base. This 
qualifies Tosaka as having the fourth characteristic of Western Marxism, which is calling for possible 
alternatives to the status quo. However, Tosaka lacked the institutional ideals that Gramsci’s 
educational reform embraced. It is hard to say whether this suggests a lack of institutional perspective 
in Tosaka’s thought, or the harsh surveillance under which he lived. It is certain, however, that he did 
not aim to rescue formal education, but that he rather emphasized the possibility of enlightenment 
through journalism.  
Tosaka observed that almost no alternatives were proposed in his time. Notably, liberalism 
failed to contest the developing fascism: Japanism. He even attributed the quick success of ideological 
control to the inclination of the liberalism of his time – what he called “cultural liberalism.” In his 
Japanese Ideology, by distinguishing liberalism into three subcategories – namely its economic, 
political, and cultural variants – he identified cultural liberalism as its latest form, arguing that it 
fuelled what he called “Japanism” – the ideology of the crystallizing alleged Japaneseness (JI: 17–
32)17. According to Tosaka, cultural liberalism was distinctively idealist – even subjectivist – and 
rested on the philosophical seriousness of the thought of cultural liberals without taking into 
consideration the historical development of their subjects. Typically represented by some major 
thinkers from the Kyoto School, such as Nishida Kitarō, Tanabe Hajime, and Watsuji Tetsurō, Tosaka 
condemned this inclination as helping scholars and journalists to detach themselves from the world of 
politics through which control over society was exercised (JI: 361–8). Fuelled by cultural liberalism, 
Japanism as a type of fascism represented an “ideologically idealistic interpretation of social things,” 
associated with romantic and nostalgic sentiments for essentialism, exemplified by the portrayal of the 
paternalistic family as the original image of the Japanese family (JI: 185). All in all, according to 
Tosaka, Japanism, reinforced by cultural liberalism, only offered empty solutions to existing problems. 
In order to propose his alternative for enlightenment, Tosaka, interestingly, focused on the 
notion of “common sense”, yet in a different sense from that of Gramsci. He started by distinguishing 
two meanings of common sense: theoretical and normative. As his theoretical definition of common 
sense signifies the vague understanding of something that ordinary people share, it coincides with 
Gramsci’s conception of common sense. This theoretical meaning comes to the forefront when one 
denounces unsophisticated, and normally confusing, conceptions in the lives of ordinary people as 
those of “common sense” (JI: 80–1). By contrast, Tosaka insisted that common sense also denotes a 
set of shared normative criteria, or the standard of morality, in the given society. For example, our 
“common sense” says that we should not throw rubbish in the street, and that we should put it in a 
                                                     
17 However, his criticism did not discard liberalism in general. He seemed to suggest, although with reservations, that Kawai 
Eijirō, a radical liberal, was the exceptional example of a “political” type of liberalism (JI: 411–12).  
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waste bin instead. Put differently, in Tosaka’s time, it was common sense not to raise objections to the 
nationalist education, such as the custom of bowing to the picture of the Emperor. As such, if we 
scrutinize the normative use of common sense, then we would assume the standard of morality of the 
society that we are looking at, and how this reflects the underlying array of social institutions (JI: 86). 
It was this second meaning of common sense that Tosaka thought it possible to elaborate, as resistance 
to ideological control. 
In this context, Tosaka stressed the critical role of enlightenment in “an age of barbarism” 
(JI: 108) as the concrete project of Marxism to elevate common sense in its normative definition. 
Apart from formal education, he envisaged how journalism would become considerably influential in 
the public sphere, since journalism has a close connection to people’s actual everyday life, and is 
therefore likely to grapple with its “actuality.” For Tosaka, actuality must be related to “current 
affairs” (or the “contemporary situation,” i.e. Jikyoku) (Zenshū 4: 137–9). Jikyoku, as a word, clearly 
refers to Japan’s political situation in the 1930s. In this sense, journalism was expected to carry out the 
enlightenment of the people, rather than serve as a simple proliferation of knowledge (Zenshū 4: 341):  
Journalism’s mission is to deal with daily, topical, and actual things. Actuality stems from 
actual reality. And that such actual reality is taking place in activity is an everyday phenomenon […]. 
Exact knowledge about how actual reality takes place is nothing but the knowledge and theory about 
concrete truth. If this accompanies analysis of society, it appears as political and topical. […] Our 
everyday life is the most realistic element in the history of society (Zenshū 4: 152).  
The people can grasp science as the way through which to obtain true knowledge: this is 
perhaps the underlying idea of Tosaka’s optimistic view of enlightenment (Zenshū 2: 92; cf. 
Yoshimoto 1966: 42). As noted above, Tosaka’s alternative lacked institutional sense in that it 
emphasized enlightenment and jettisoned formal education. It is difficult, again, to ascertain whether 
this idea derived from the inclinations of his thought or the circumstances under which he lived. 
However, it is nonetheless certain that, unlike orthodox Marxists, Tosaka considered it possible and 
necessary to elaborate alternatives to the status quo by virtue of human agency, and this shows him 
possessing the fourth characteristic of Western Marxism. 
 
Conclusion: “Western” Marxism? 
We have looked at how Gramsci and Tosaka shared the four notable characteristics of Western 
Marxism. To recapitulate, these were: 1) rejection of crude economism; 2) acknowledgement of the 
critical role of civil society in obtaining people’s consent for the governance of modern states; 3) 
scrutiny of the mechanism with which people were mobilized through internalization of social norms; 
and 4) proposition of an alternative reform plan based on the autonomy of politics.  
Despite the lack of mutual contact, the parallel between Gramsci and Tosaka urges us to 
reconsider the distinctiveness of Marxism during this period. Both developed their Marxist ideas 
against orthodox Marxism, in particular against economic determinism, which neglected the way that 
the governance of modern states rested on its ideological power to mobilize the masses. Gramsci and 
Tosaka observed the task of Marxism during a time in which fascism exploited this mechanism both in 
Italy and Japan. 
What is the implication of this similarity in Marxist theoretical formation, considering the 
differences in their social, political, and geographical circumstances? Western Marxism confusingly 
entails geographical as well as theoretical notions – as noted at the beginning of this paper. In this 
respect, Tosaka’s theoretical affinity to Western Marxism suggests that the geographical notion 
attributed to this category might have limited its theoretical fruitfulness, which instead can be 
discerned beyond the opposition of the geographical West to Soviet Russia, representing the East18. A 
small piece of work with a broad perspective such as this cannot do justice to the global development 
of Marxism during this period. Nevertheless, Tosaka’s affinity to Western Marxism might suggest that 
the global task of Marxism was to analyze the governance of modern states and to propose alternatives 
to it, following the simultaneous development of modern states occurring at that time, rather than 
resting on the crude economism of orthodox Marxism. In this sense, it would be necessary to further 
develop the study of Marxism in non-Western areas during this period. By doing so, it may be possible 
to suggest that the characteristics now acknowledged as belonging to Western Marxism can also be 
discerned in Marxism in the periphery, where the emergence of modernity most strongly conflicted 
with local societies, such as in the cases of Italy and Japan. 
  
                                                     
18 The editors of Tosaka’s English anthology point out that his works are a “powerful corrective” to the category of Western 
Marxism (Kawashima, Schäfer and Stolz 2013: viii). However, they could have been more precise by pointing out that 
Tosaka displayed considerable theoretical similarities with Western Marxism, irrespective of geographical differences. 
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